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Maryland Discovery Changes: Reform or Retreat? 
Prof. John A. Lynch Jr. 
On June 13, 1994, the Court of Appeals issued a 
rules order which included, among other things, four 
changes in Maryland discovery procedure. 1 These 
changes became effective October 1, 1994.2 The por-
tions of the rules order that affect discovery are: 
1. The insertion of a new Rule 2-40 1 (c) which 
provides that the parties are "encouraged" to reach an 
agreement on a plan for the scheduling and completion 
of 
2. An amendment to Rule 2-421 that permits a 
party to serve more than one set of written interrogato-
ries directed to any other party (though not increasing 
the maximum number of thirty 
3. A new rule providing for a scheduling order in 
most cases, Rule 2-504, which must include a date by 
which all discovery must be concluded,3 and which may 
include terms: 
a. Limiting discovery otherwise permitted 
under the rules, including reasonable limitations on the 
number of interrogatories, depositions, and other 
forms of discovery,4 and 
b. Resolving any disputes between the 
parties relating to and 
4. A new rule providing for a scheduling confer-
ence in certain instances, one of which is when a request 
for such a conference by a party states that, despite a 
good faith effort, the parties have been unable to reach 
an agreement on a plan for the scheduling and comple-
tion of discovery, 6 and which permits a court to order 
that parties complete discovery prior to such confer-
ence that enables them to participate meaningfully and 
in good faith. 7 
On one hand, one might argue that the rules changes 
that focus on the activity of the parties and the courts 
in scheduling, completing and, yes, perhaps even limit-
ing discovery may provide a new framework for resolv-
ing the two most aggravating discovery problems: the 
overuse of discovery and the refusal of some counsel to 
respond to discovery in a cooperative manner. On the 
other hand, one might contend that these provisions are 
simply a "feel-good" addition to discovery control 
methods that exist a1ready.8 Which of these analyses is 
more likely to prove true is addressed below. What is 
indisputable, however, is that these discovery changes 
are remarkably modest in light of the ferment concern-
ing discovery in the last few years among procedural 
policy-makers in the Maryland and federal judicial 
systems. 
I. The Controversial "Core Discovery" and Other 
Discovery Limits 
That the discovery provisions adopted by the June 
13, 1994 rules order are but a pale reflection of more 
dramatic proposals may be seen in a comparison of the 
new rules with proposals contained in the two previous 
versions of the 124th report of the Rules Committee. 
The first ancestor of the report ultimately adopted 
by the Court of Appeals was submitted by the Rules 
Committee in March of 1993.9 It would have reduced 
the limit on interrogatories under Rule 2-422(a) from 
thirty to twenty, limited requests for documents and 
property under Rule 2-422( a) to thirty and, most signif-
icantly, limited depositions of "fact" witnesses to not 
more than five. It contained roughly the same provision 
for scheduling orders as what was ultimately adopted, 
but most significantly, it would have added new Rule 2-
403, providing for initial disclosure of information. It 
would have amended Rule 2-401 (b) to preclude any 
other discovery until the initial disclosure was complet-
ed and would have prevented parties from altering by 
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stipulation such initial disclosure. 
This initial disclosure, also called "core discovery," 
was the heart of the Rules Committee's discovery 
proposals. It would have required, within thirty days 
after service of a pleading or motion responsive to a 
complaint, that each party disclose to every other party 
to the extent then known: 
1. The identity, etc., of persons other than experts, 
having discoverable information that tends to support a 
position that the disclosing party has taken or intends to 
take in the action, including any claims for damages; 
2. A copy or description of all discoverable docu-
ments and other tangible things in control of the party 
that tend to support a position that the disclosing party 
has taken or intends to take in the action, including any 
claim for damages; 
3. An itemization of any economic damages 
claimed by the disclosing party; and 
4. The identity of any insurer and the applicable 
policy limits of any insurance agreement with any 
insurer which might be liable to satisfy any judgment in 
the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments 
made to satisfy the judgment. 
This initial discovery proposal generated vocifer-
ous opposition from many quarters. This should not 
have been surprising, since it was modeled on new 
Federal Rule 26(a). Opposition to that rule, which 
became effective on December 1, 1993, was so strong 
that the House of Representatives passed a bill eliminat-
ing initial disclosure from the federal rules amend-
ments,IO a rare congressional intrusion into the federal 
rulemaking process. 
In December, 1993, the Rules Committee proposed 
revisions to its rules change proposals. II The effects of 
the vigorous opposition to the Committee's proposals 
concerning discovery were apparent. The Committee 
abandoned its proposals concerning quantitative limits 
on fact depositions, interrogatories, and requests for 
production of documents and property, and it limited 
the initial disclosure to motor tort cases. Ultimately 
even this slimmed-down initial disclosure requirement 
was rejected by the court of appeals. 
II. Reasons for Proposed Changes 
Was Maryland discovery practice "broke" to the 
degree that such a controversial "fix" was required? 
Clearly, the federal judiciary has expressed much disen-
chantment with discovery.12 A change to the Federal 
Rules in 1980 was aimed at creating more judicial 
management of discovery; I3 other changes in 1983 
required the court to limit discovery in certain circum-
stances,14 and required counsel to sign discovery re-
quests, responses and objections. IS None of these 
changes to federal discovery were adopted in the 1984 
revision of the Maryland Rules or in the modest revi-
sions to the discovery rules that have been made since 
then. 
It appears, however, that the perception of a need 
to get litigation under control has come to Maryland, 
and that a good part of what needs to be controlled is 
discovery. In 1991, the Rules Committee and the 
Maryland State Bar Association formed an Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Management of Litigation. This 
body, which included Rules Committee members, per-
sons appointed by the president of the Bar Association 
and three circuit court judges, produced a report that 
asserted: 
Although the Maryland court system has historically 
been one ofthe more efficient in the nation ... it is on the 
brink oflosing its ability to handle fairly and efficiently 
the constantly increasing stream of cases that flow 
through it. 16 
Highlighting the role of discovery in this situation, the 
report stated that: 
[u]nnecessary and abusive discovery may well be the 
single most contributing factor in the cost and delay 
involved in litigation. 17 
The report resulted in the creation of a special subcom-
mittee of the Rules Committee which fashioned the 
basis of the proposed discovery rules changes discussed 
above. 
As noted above, the rules changes pertaining to 
discovery that were ultimately adopted bore faint re-
semblance to the original proposals of the Rules Com-
mittee. Whether the end product represents a failure of 
the rulemaking process to respond to a crisis or the 
sensible rejection of a flawed solution to the crisis, 
depends upon one's view of the merits of the original 
proposal. This writer believes that the original propos-
als, particularly core discovery, would not have solved 
the larger problems connected with discovery, and that 
they would simply have created new problems. 
m.Not the Right Medicine at All 
As noted above, the core discovery proposal was 
modeled on new Federal Rule 26(a). The assumption 
of the drafters of the federal rule was that it would be 
more efficient to require an exchange by the parties of 
certain information instead of having the parties request 
such information from each other as they chose. IS Any 
efficiencies to be gained from such compulsory discov-
ery rest upon the validity of two assumptions: 1) that 
this process would not require the production of more 
information initially (plus later discovery) than would 
be requested eventually, and 2) that it would function 
without creating significant new administrative difficul-
ties. Both of these assump-
of persons possessing information or documents was 
whether they "tend[ ed] to support a position that a 
disclosing party has taken or intends to take in the 
action, including any claims for damages." The stan-
dard for disclosure in Federal Rule 26( a) is "relevan[ ce] 
to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the plead-
ings." This difference between the Maryland proposal 
and the federal rule avoided a significant ethical conflict 
likely to be faced under the federal rule. Under the 
federal rule, counsel will face a dilemma between 
conscientious compliance with the disclosure rule and 
the professional obligation not to assist his or her 
opponent. 20 
Nonetheless, the phrase "tends to support a posi-
tion," unlike relevance, 
tions seem questionable. 
That core discovery 
would have diminished the 
volume of discovery is sim-
ply counter-intuitive. It 
would have required that 
there be an exchange of pa-
perwork in every case. As 
Justice Scalia stated in his 
dissent to the Supreme Court 
order implementing the fed-
"As tile years have 
passed, discovery tecll-
niques and tactics have 
become a highly devel-
the federal standard, is a 
neologism. It could have 
taken several trips to ap-
pellate courts and many 
years for the definition of 
this term, and hence, the 
scope of disclosure, to 
be determined. In the 
meantime, parties con-
ducting "post-core dis-
oped litigation art - one 
not infrequently exploit-
ed to the disadvantage of 
justice. " 
eral version of core discov-
ery, "the duty-to-disclose regime does not replace the 
current, much-criticized discovery process, it adds a 
further layer of discovery. "19 
It is doubtful that the new limits on discovery 
originally proposed by the Rules Committee -- twenty 
rather than thirty interrogatories, a maximum of thirty 
requests for documents, and five depositions of fact 
witnesses -- would have brought about a reduction in 
the use of existing discovery devices that would have 
offset the increase caused by core discovery. The most 
draconian limitation, that on depositions of fact wit-
nesses, would probably not have reduced any discovery 
that core discovery was intended to supplant. Core 
discovery and, to some extent, the limit on depositions 
of fact witnesses, would have created administrative 
problems that would likely have offset advantages that 
might have been derived from an initial mandatory 
exchange of information. 
In one respect, the Maryland core discovery pro-
posal was superior to that which became part of the 
federal rules: the standard for production of the names 
covery" discovery would 
have been expected to 
assume that their opposing counsel had construed the 
scope of required disclosures conservatively, necessi-
tating broad discovery requests. Under such circum-
stances it is doubtful that resort to traditional discovery 
would have been much diminished by the "reform." 
The proposed core discovery in Maryland would 
have required production within thirty days after ser-
vice ofthe defendant's pleading. This would have been 
a procedural nightmare for institutional defendants that 
can often barely piece together the details of the trans-
action at issue and answer the complaint within thirty 
days.21 
The limit of five depositions for "fact witnesses" 
also could either have been too inflexible or have 
generated a need for judicial involvement in discovery 
that does not exist now. 
The proposal shadowed a change to Federal Rule 30 
which limits the number of depositions that may be 
taken by a party to ten. 22 The federal rule contains an 
explicit provision that the court may grant leave for a 
party to take more depositions?3 The amendment to 
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Maryland Rule 2-411 that would have imposed the limit 
of five depositions for fact witnesses did not have a 
specific provision, or standards, by which a court could 
order that a party be permitted to take more. It is 
possible that a proposed amendment to Rule 2-401(t) 
would have permitted a court to allow a party a larger 
number of depositions of fact witnesses.24 Whether it 
did so would have been an issue that would have 
required appellate attention. If there had been no way 
for a court to increase the number of fact depositions a 
party could take upon an appropriate showing, the rule 
would have been intolerably restrictive. Many complex 
product liability, libel or even, yes, motor tort cases 
require a party exercising only reasonable diligence to 
take more than five depositions to learn what happened 
or to preserve testimony. Even if one assumes that a 
court might have permitted a party to take more than 
five, that number is so small that trial courts would not 
infrequently have had to entertain disputes concerning 
whether to allow more. 
The need for a numerical limitation on fact deposi-
tions is somewhat perplexing since the rules already 
limit a party, unless a court orders otherwise, to one 
deposition per witness. 25 The deposition takes place 
outside of court supervision and generally places most 
of the effort and expense connected therewith on the 
discovering party. As with the core discovery proposal, 
it is doubtful that limiting depositions offact witnesses 
to five would have reduced the total cost or need for 
judicial management of discovery. That it did not 
survive the process of changing the discovery rules 
probably speaks well of the process. 
IV. Conclusion 
At the end of the day, the most significant reforms 
are probably the requirement that a scheduling order 
under new Rule 2-504 includes a cutoff date for discov-
ery and the possibility that it may contain limits on 
discovery and the resolution of discovery disputes. 
Significant also is the ability of a party under new Rule 
2-504.1 to obtain a scheduling conference when the 
parties have been unable to reach agreement on a plan 
for discovery. Both provide mechanisms to confront 
with meaningful deadlines that legion of foot-dragging 
counsel who refuse to cooperate with discovery re-
quests in a timely manner. If trial judges make it clear 
that failure to follow discovery deadlines in scheduling 
orders will have serious consequences, and that counsel 
who are simply trying to obtain from their opponents 
what the rules permit will receive vigorous assistance in 
scheduling conferences, these rules changes will make 
litigation more manageable. 
If these things do not come to pass, there will be time 
later for more quantitative limits on discovery and 
perhaps even core discovery. Ultimately, however, 
intricate discovery rules, such as those that have been 
developing in the federal system,26 are likely to be a poor 
substitute for cooperative compliance with relatively 
open-ended discovery rules, such as Maryland's, en-
gendered, when necessary, by purposeful judicial en-
forcement. 
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